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International Liquidity Provision During the
Financial Crisis: A View from Switzerland
Raphael Auer and Sébastien Kraenzlin
The authors document the provision of liquidity in Swiss francs (CHF) by the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) to banks located outside Switzerland during the recent financial crisis. What makes
the Swiss case special is the size of this liquidity provision—at times, 80 percent of all short-term
CHF liquidity provided by the SNB—and the measures adopted to distribute this liquidity. In addi-
tion to making CHF available to other central banks via swap facilities, the SNB also allows banks
outside Switzerland to directly participate in its repurchase agreement transactions. Although
this policy was adopted for reasons predating the 2007-09 financial crisis, it proved tremendously
helpful during the crisis by providing the European banking system direct access to the primary
funding facility for CHF. (JEL E41, E52, F33, F34)
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a discussion, see, for example, Goldberg, Kennedy,
and Miu, forthcoming). Much less noticed was
the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) large-scale pro-
vision of Swiss franc (CHF) liquidity to the bank-
ing system throughout the European Union and
beyond.
In this article, we document the CHF liquidity
provision by the SNB to banks located outside
Switzerland. What makes the Swiss case special
is not only the size of the liquidity provision to
banks outside Switzerland (at times, 80 percent
of all short-term CHF liquidity provided by the
SNB), but also the measures adopted to distribute
this liquidity.
In addition to providing CHF to other central
banks via swap facilities, the SNB allows foreign
banks to directly participate in its repo transac-
tions. Although this policy was adopted for rea-
sons predating the recent financial crisis, it proved
I
n the years leading up to 2007, banks
across the globe dramatically increased
their balance sheet exposure to foreign
currencies. This led to increased trading
between banks with a need to refinance in the
foreign currency and domestic banks with
deposits and consequently sufficient funds to
lend in that currency (i.e., extensive cross-border
trading). With the onset of the financial crisis
and the successive drying-up of the repurchase
agreement (repo) market and especially the unse-
cured interbank money market (see Guggenheim,
Kraenzlin, and Schumacher, 2011), the private
sector no longer provided this liquidity, thus
requiring a coordinated action by the world’s
major central banks.
In particular, the provision of dollar liquidity
to non-U.S. banks by the Federal Reserve garnered
ample attention in the global financial press (for
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Bank of St. Louis.tremendously helpful during the crisis when it
gave the European banking system direct access
to the primary funding facility for CHF.
Finally, the Swiss case is exceptional because
from March 2009 to June 2010, faced with defla-
tion risks and zero interest rates, the SNB inter-
vened in the foreign exchange market as part of
its unconventional policies. The resulting large-
scale inflow of CHF to the financial sector flooded
the international banking system with CHF liquid-
ity. As a consequence, demand for the liquidity
provided by the SNB’s open market operations
virtually ceased to exist. We believe that, although
liquidity provision itself was not an objective of
the foreign exchange interventions, the transac-
tions may have contributed to stabilizing the
European banking system.
THE ORIGINS: SWISS FRANC
LOANS IN AUSTRIA AND CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE
Because of the traditionally low interest
rates in Switzerland and the low-exchange-rate
volatility observed since the introduction of the
euro (EUR), many households and firms across
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) relied on CHF-
denominated loans as a source of cheap funding.
The resulting aggregate exposure was substantial:
By early 2009, households and non-banking-
sector firms in CEE economies had accumulated
the equivalent of CHF 120 billion worth of debt
denominated in Swiss currency. In Austria, pri-
marily because of its geographic proximity to
Switzerland, total exposure was then over CHF
80 billion. Non-banks in the other countries of
the euro zone also relied on such loans. In total,
the exposure of non-Swiss European banks
amounted to about CHF 400 billion in late 2008.1
The size of the exposure has raised many
concerns about the financial stability of the bank-
ing sector, given the possibility of continued CHF
strength or even appreciation. (Most notable are
concerns expressed by Krugman, 2009.) Since few
of the debtors have any CHF income, such an
appreciation could cause large-scale default and
the resulting loan losses could strain the banking
sector in these economies.2 However, a second
financial stability concern related to the CHF
loans has received surprisingly little attention—
with the notable exception of Pann, Seliger, and
Übeleis (2010)—namely, the resulting funding
and liquidity risk faced by non-Swiss banks.
SYSTEMIC SWISS FRANC
SHORTAGES DURING THE CRISIS
CHF-denominated loans obtained by non-
banks outside Switzerland are typically granted
by non-Swiss banks that, in turn, finance them-
selves by borrowing from financial institutions
in Switzerland. As in all bank business, these non-
Swiss banks provide long-term loans yet finance
themselves on a short-term basis. Their ability to
roll over maturing CHF positions became stressed
when the interbank money market progressively
dried up following the onset of the financial crisis
in August 2007, particularly after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (see
Guggenheim, Kraenzlin, and Schumacher, 2011).
In international currency markets, any bank
can potentially obtain financing in any foreign
currency either by going directly to the interbank
money market or by obtaining funds from its cen-
tral bank and swapping the received funds into
the desired foreign currency. In principle, these
two methods should ensure the rate at which a
currency is funded is the same.
During the recent financial crisis, however,
interbank money markets temporarily faltered.
Auer and Kraenzlin
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1 Why lenders that issued these loans were not more concerned
with the embedded default risk might seem puzzling. However, a
microeconomic study of loan issuance to private households in
Austria (see Beer, Ongena, and Peter, 2008) finds that banks did
screen potential borrowers and awarded CHF-denominated loans
only to the more solvent clients (also see Auer et al., 2009). In addi-
tion, many such loans contained provisions giving the banks the
right to coerce conversion of a loan to the local currency if the
exchange rate exceeded a certain trigger level. The combination
of these two features probably explains why lenders were not
concerned with default risk when issuing these loans.
2 The aggregate exposure of CEE and Austria to low-interest-rate
currencies had already caused losses of around $60 billion (U.S.
dollars) for these nations in 2008-09 alone; see Auer and
Wehrmüller (2009). Note that empirical studies by Beer, Ongena,
and Peter (2008); Brown, Ongena, and Yesin (2011); Brown, Peter,
and Wehrmüller (2009); and Puhr, Schwaiger, and Sigmund (2009)
show that the debtors tend to be creditworthy, thus suggesting that
such concerns are less relevant than the sheer magnitude of the
aggregate exposure suggests.For example, Figure 1 documents the strains in
the CHF money market beginning in October 2008.
The figure plots the difference between the unse-
cured and secured overnight interbank rate for
both CHF funds and EUR funds. While these two
spreads are historically rather low and co-move
closely, the spread on CHF rose steeply during
October 2008, reaching values well over 300 basis
points. Consequently, the movement in the CHF
money market is a result of an increase in liquid-
ity and not credit risk premia since the latter
would be reflected in both currencies.
The CHF-specific spike in the cost of obtain-
ing unsecured funds was caused by a combination
of the need by banks outside Switzerland to con-
tinuously roll over maturing interbank loans and
the shrinking supply for these funds. Most Swiss
banks and a considerable number of non-Swiss
banks have access to the Swiss repo system—the
prevailing secured money market in Swiss francs.
In a calm market environment, these banks would
have immediately exploited this profit opportunity
and provided unsecured funds to banks without
access to the Swiss repo system.
However, against the backdrop of the global
financial crisis and the fear of counterparty default
risk, this situation did not occur and the spread
between secured and unsecured CHF funds
remained elevated for several trading days. With  -
out access to the Swiss repo system, even banks
with ample collateral could not obtain secured
funding from the SNB or the secured interbank
market. In Switzerland, only a negligible amount
of repo transactions are traded outside the Swiss
repo system (i.e., over the counter).
The lower cross-border trading could have
posed a substantial danger to the stability of the
financial sector at large. If banks across the euro
zone and CEE were unable to obtain CHF in the
money market, then non-Swiss banks, in turn,
could try to reduce their exposure by liquidating
CHF loans they had made to their clients. Given
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Figure 1
Difference Between Unsecured and Secured Overnight Interbank Rate for CHF Funds and 
EUR Funds
NOTE: The figure shows the evolution of the difference between the unsecured and secured overnight interbank rate for Swiss franc
(CHF) funds and euro (EUR) funds from August to November 2008 (5-day moving average). The two horizontal lines correspond to the
announcement (October 15, 2008) and the actual start (October 20, 2008) of EUR/CHF swap auctions by the European Central Bank,
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary), and the National Bank of Poland. the banking tensions at the time, this move would
have driven many debtors into default and could
have started a disorderly winding-down of CHF
loans, with increasing default rates implying the
need for additional loan-loss provisions, thereby
increasing pressure to liquidate CHF exposure.
This vicious cycle could have had dire conse-
quences for the banking system and the real
economy.
PHASE I: INTER-CENTRAL BANK
SWAP FACILITIES 
The drying-up of liquidity distribution in
foreign currency posed a problem more challeng-
ing than the breakdown of the domestic interbank
money market: No central bank, on its own, can
provide a large amount of liquidity in a foreign
currency in a timely manner.3 First, the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks in CEE
obviously cannot create CHF liquidity without
issuing their own debt securities in the respective
currency. Second, the SNB can create CHF liquid-
ity but cannot supply this liquidity to banks lack-
ing access to the Swiss repo system or banks with
insufficient SNB-eligible collateral, which in 2007
was the case for most banks involved in CHF-
denominated lending in CEE.4
To overcome this market friction, the SNB
jointly announced with the ECB and subsequently
with the Narodowy Bank Polski (the National
Bank of Poland) and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
(the central bank of the Republic of Hungary) that
all these central banks would directly distribute
CHF-denominated funds to their counterparties.5
Since (i) nearly all banks that require funding of
some CHF exposure are registered with one of
these four central banks and (ii) the conditions
for these funds are similar across these countries,
in effect the private sector instantly gained access
to the primary source of CHF: the SNB.6
As Figure 1 clearly shows, on the value date
of the first swap transaction, the CHF tensions
in the unsecured money market ceased once the
CHF auctions were implemented by the partner
central banks. In other words, the swap transac-
tions were effective in reducing the liquidity
premium and in returning the interest rate spread
for Swiss francs to a level similar to that for euro
funds.
Figure 2 documents the extent to which banks
located in the European Union used the EUR/CHF
swap facility. With the introduction of the facility,
demand for CHF in the euro zone jumped to
around CHF 40 billion and stayed there for about
6 months. Thereafter, demand for Swiss francs
under the EUR/CHF swap facility leveled off and
ceased after January 2010.
PHASE II: ENHANCING FOREIGN
BANKS’ DIRECT ACCESS TO THE
REPO SYSTEM
Figure 1 demonstrates that the EUR/CHF swap
was a functioning measure to address short-run
liquidity mismatches. Since swaps are just a
means to distribute liquidity more effectively,
they involve no direct costs, but they do still have
limits. First, their maximum volume is agreed
upon in advance, so they are not as flexible as
measures controlled by only one central bank.
Second, the swap agreement itself to some extent
fractionalizes the market for CHF liquidity since
Auer and Kraenzlin
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3 The SNB also issued its own debt certificates in U.S. dollars (SNB
USD bills). The U.S. dollars were subsequently used to finance
the SNB’s loan to its stabilization fund. The outstanding volume
peaked at $20 billion USD. A central bank can thus obtain foreign
currency and subsequently provide liquidity to its counterparties.
Depending on the urgency and extent of lending, however, it may
prove difficult. 
4 In general, the establishment of access to the Swiss repo system takes
several months. Hence, banks with CHF exposure but no access
to the Swiss repo system could not establish access quickly
enough. 
5 Although the central bank swap agreements are bilateral, it is
sometimes the case that funding is “recycled” to other countries.
This is an especially relevant channel for international CHF liquid-
ity provision as it is likely that banks in the euro area, particularly
Austrian banks, forwarded CHF funds to their subsidiaries across
CEE. Thus, the CHF funding was indirectly available to more
countries.
6 The Hungarian central bank offered slightly different conditions
than the other central banks. See Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu
(2011), Auer and Kraenzlin (2009), and Aizenman and Pasricha
(2010) for a discussion of various swap line agreements around
the globe.the total supply of CHF is split across different
selling platforms.7
Finally, swap agreements also involve some
loss of control over monetary policy because, in
essence, the monetary base is partly controlled by
a foreign central bank. The main worry of policy-
makers is that such swap agreements could create
inflationary pressure because opening new means
to distribute liquidity can increase the total sup-
ply of money. For example, the maximum amount
of a swap is agreed upon months in advance.
Since the receiving central bank may auction off
the maximum amount (but is not obliged to do
so), uncertainty in the growth of the money sup-
ply is increased.8 Given these shortcomings, the
SNB, the ECB, and the euro zone member central
banks, as well as all other affected central banks,
advised banks with major exposure to the CHF
to seek access to the SNB’s repo system.9
The SNB is also legally empowered to pro-
vide liquidity to banks outside Switzerland.10
The original intent in allowing foreign banks to
access the Swiss repo system was to (i) reduce
Auer and Kraenzlin
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Figure 2
Volume of CHF Loans to Euro Zone Banks via the EUR/CHF Swap Facility
7 A further potential worry is that these agreements could entail a
larger counterparty default risk. This is not the case. First, there is
no risk involved for the central bank distributing the funds since
the receiving central banks guarantee these transactions. Second,
there is also no effect on counterparty default risk for the receiving
central bank since it transacts with its regular counterparties against
the regular collateral basket.
8 Two main reasons explain why the loss of control of the monetary
base is rather contained. First, the central bank that originates the
funds can sterilize the effect on the monetary base by issuing its
own debt certificates or providing liquidity, thereby absorbing open
market operations. While ceding some control over monetary policy
to other central banks is of little concern in the current low-inflation
environment, such concerns will definitely become a first-order
political topic once inflationary pressures resume and central banks
must refocus on their core task of maintaining price stability.
9 In particular, the Austrian financial authorities (the Austrian
National Bank and the Austrian Financial Market Authority
[Finanzmarktaufsicht]) have assumed a key role in persuading
commercial banks in Austria to seek access to the Swiss repo 
system.
10 The repo system used by the SNB is also the same system in which
the majority of interbank CHF repo transactions are conducted.
Hence, even banks without access to the SNB could use the inter-
bank repo market for refinancing purposes.the dependence on the few large Swiss financial
institutions, (ii) improve the general liquidity in
the banking system, and (iii) thereby facilitate
the steering of a longer-term money market rate—
namely, the 3-month CHF London Interbank
overnight rate (LIBOR).
This pre-crisis policy also proved useful in
addressing cross-border liquidity shortages during
the financial turmoil. The solid black line in
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the number of
banks in the Swiss repo system located outside
Switzerland (right axis). As of mid-November
2010, 59 such banks had established access to
the Eurex Repo electronic trading platform, a
necessary condition to participate in the SNB’s
repo auctions. Of these 59 banks, 23 were located
in Austria, 16 in Germany, and 6 in the United
Kingdom.11
Figure 3 also documents the volume of CHF
liquidity obtained directly from the SNB by for-
eign banks, which temporarily exceeded CHF 60
billion. The comparatively small volume of CHF
liquidity obtained by Swiss banks makes clear
just how sizable the foreign demand was: For
most of 2009 and early in 2010, well over 70 per-
cent of the liquidity demand was from outside
Switzerland. With the money obtained indirectly
through EUR/CHF swaps, short-term CHF liquid-
ity held by non-Swiss Banks rose to 90 percent.
Figure 4 highlights the importance of direct
access to the SNB repo system for banks located
outside Switzerland (see also Kraenzlin and von
Scarpatetti, 2011). This figure presents an area
diagram (stacked) showing total provision of CHF
liquidity to banks located outside Switzerland.
The figure shows the volume supplied within the
Swiss repo system (light blue) and the volume
supplied via EUR/CHF swaps (dark blue).
Auer and Kraenzlin
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11 The SNB also accepts securities denominated in foreign currency.
High credit standards and a highly efficient risk management pro-
cedure imply that the SNB does not apply haircuts. Banks located
outside Switzerland thus can deliver non-CHF-denominated secu-
rities in SNB repo transactions. It is unclear to what extent this
possibility has contributed to the high use of the SNB repo facility
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Figure 3
Use of the SNB Repo System by Banks Within and Outside SwitzerlandPHASE III: EXCHANGE RATE
INTERVENTIONS
Figures 3 and 4 document not only the extent
of the CHF shortage during 2008 and 2009, but
also that this demand decreased substantially
starting in mid-2009; demand vanished com-
pletely in mid-2010. Although it is tempting to
attribute this to a resurgence of activity in the
interbank money market, this is not fully the
case. Rather, starting in March 2009, the SNB
intervened in the foreign exchange market, even-
tually building up a foreign reserve position worth
over CHF 200 billion, compared with a pre-2009
level of less than CHF 50 billion.
While the exchange rate interventions were
part of the SNB’s unconventional measures to
avert deflation risks in Switzerland, an unintended
side effect of the interventions was the resolution
of the international CHF liquidity shortage: The
supply of the additional CHF 150 billion is avail-
able to the banking system on a permanent basis
and, consequently, the majority of banks are
awash with CHF liquidity.
Auer and Kraenzlin
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Figure 5 puts the extent of the liquidity pro-
vision via the exchange rate interventions in per-
spective. The figure shows the combined total of
CHF liquidity supplied to banks located within
and outside Switzerland. The three key elements
of this supply are the Swiss repo system (dark gray
area), the EUR/CHF swaps (light gray area), and
the SNB exchange rate interventions (black area).
Figure 5 documents that the exchange rate
interventions were so sizable that they in effect
created enough liquidity that demand for liquidity
via repo and swap transactions ceased altogether.
In fact, the SNB currently absorbs liquidity to
implement monetary policy. This is done, on the
one hand, through weekly issuance of the SNB’s
own money market bills (SNB bills) and, on the
other hand, through daily one-week repo auctions
(see also Anderson, Gascon, and Liu, 2010, and
SNB, 2011).
The exchange rate interventions thus proved
helpful from a financial stability perspective.
Using loans denominated in a low-interest-rate

















Total Liquidity Provision to Banks Outside Switzerlandtrade strategy. Such strategies are always subject
to the danger of a disorderly winding-down of
positions: If the losses stemming from an appre-
ciation of the CHF become too large such that
counterparty default risks surface, carry traders
can no longer refinance their positions and must
liquidate them; this, in turn, causes a further
appreciation of the CHF. The combination of swap
facilities, enhanced direct access to the primary
source of CHF liquidity, and exchange rate inter-
ventions was instrumental in ensuring that, to
date, such sizable disruptive winding-downs have
not taken place and are unlikely in the near future.
Auer and Kraenzlin
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CONCLUSION
Small frictions in how the private sector dis-
tributes liquidity internationally can have large
effects on the interest rate paid. The rapid, coor-
dinated, and large policy response by central
banks across Europe may have avoided a disor-
derly winding-down of the carry trade positions
built up by European households and firms in the
years leading up to the recent financial crisis.
International liquidity mismatches involving
Swiss francs are currently of little concern, which
may be an unintended side effect of the liquidity
injection via SNB interventions in the foreign
exchange market. The establishment of access 
to the Swiss repo system by banks outside
Switzerland also contributed to this relatively
calm environment. As of this writing, the private
sector thus has won time to reduce its CHF expo-
















Increase in Foreign Reserves Compared with March 2009
Figure 5
Total Supply of CHF Liquidity
SOURCE: Data for reserve levels are from the SNB’s Monthly Statistical Bulletin.REFERENCES
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